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INSTITUTE OF FAMILY STUDIES - 21/8/84 
Adam Graycar 
The results from the world survey of family policy 
guidelines and the other material we have just heard, 
demonstrate powerfully and unequivocally that family policy 
is, above all, a political construct. Like all political 
constructs it draws its meaning from ideological imperatives 
and from the overall polity within which it is conceived, 
protected, delivered and nurtured. The political dimension 
can be seen from two perspectives, an ideological and a 
structural perspective. While these may seem quite separate 
they are in fact inter-related and interdependent. 
Structural questions come about and are highlighted in 
the extent to which family policy is given recognition in 
national constitutions, in formal governmental arrangements, 
and in formal representational milieux. These items have been 
discussed in the world survey, and what struck me as worthy of 
further analysis was a study of the methods by which such issues 
are planted into political structures. It is of great interest 
to note that there are numerous organizations that are part of 
the politics of family policy. The International Union of 
Family Organizations is one peak body representing many 
interested and active organizations. What we are talking about 
are pressure groups, and one might try to fit the articulation 
of interests which come under the rubric "family policy" into 
a broader understanding of pressure group activity. 
2. 
All governments are the focus of claims and demands, and 
pressure groups are those that make claims, on an organized 
basis, either directly or indirectly so as to influence the 
making or administering of public policy. They stop short of 
wanting to exercise the formal powers of government, and when 
we do see, from time to time, people elected to legislatures 
on single issue platforms it is as an irritant rather than las 
potential governors that they make their mark. (There are, in 
the NSW legislature two members whose main platform is to 
prevent the erosion of "family values"). Getting back to 
pressure groups, however, two types can be distinguished, 
those that have been called sectional associations, and 
promotional associations. 
S~btibh~l associations basically attempt to speak for 
their sections of society - to defend direct and specific 
interests, and thus we find numerous organizations 
representing particular groups of or within business, 
agriculture, labour; there are groups of aborigines, miners, 
war veterans, professionals, immigrants, and on and on. Usually 
the interests are very specific, and in general one might 
expect family policy organizations to fit in here. Commonly, 
they fit into the second category - that of ·promotional 
associations. Promotional associations seek to promote a 
cause by appealing, not to a section or a specific group, but 
to everybody. Organizations which promote causes such as 
nuclear disarmament, sexual liberation, environmental issues 
and, I would argue, family policy, fit in here. 
3. 
Seldom do organizations which promote family policy 
consist primarily of people who are in the early family 
formation stages. They consist of people who have views 
about desirable family patterns and behaviours. Furthermore 
numerous studies in the po1itical science literature show 
that organizational membership (with the exception of trade 
unions) is heavily concentrated in • iddle and upper income 
strata. We have a paradoxical situation of promotion of 
policies by people who are not likely to be direct beneficiaries. 
It is not for me to speculate on what drives such people or 
fuels such activity, but it is very obvious that iromotional 
activity has a strong ideological and political component. 
It is important then to see family policy in its broader context. 
Family policy, which has roughly been described by Sheila 
Kamerman as what the state does by action or inaction to 
affect people in their roles as family members or to influence 
the future of the family as an institution, has, in the last 
half century gone through a number of stages. In the 1930s 
and 1940s in Europe - and in France and Sweden in particular 
there was an emphasis on population replacement and population 
growth, with government intervention to make such population 
growth financially bearable for families. The main strategy 
was on economic intervention and wage supplementation of 
families with children. During the 1960s the focus, again 
in Europe, was on income redistribution from those with no 
children to those with children. Here the taxation system 
was used as an important tool, and in addition to tax policies 
there was a growth in social services for families. In the 
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1970s the focus was on policies responding to changes in 
family structure as single parenthood, increasing female 
labour force participation, declining fertility, declining 
mortality, high population mobility, dual labour markets, etc., 
all became part of the changing and challenging policy mosaic. 
At the same time the proportion of households containing a 
"traditional family" that is a m~rried couple with dependent 
children in which the wife stays at home and the husband goes 
to work declined, in Australia for instance, to 17 per cent of 
households. As you are all aware this would be a very narrow 
target for policy intervention. 
Whatever the structure of families, family policy is about 
dependency - ideally about limiting dependency, but often about 
rearranging dependency. Those most obviously dependent in our 
society are children and elderly people. Public efforts devoted 
to the needs of very young and very old people are often 
justified on the grounds that much of the activity is intended 
to strengthen family life as it is to protect dependent 
individuals. 
fiscal tools. 
The main tools to be used include a variety of 
Interventions of these types are invariably 
costly, and we have seen, in recent years a questioning of 
expenditure patterns and a questioning of patterns of family 
responsibility - in other words a reappraisal of how we identify 
and deal with dependency, and how we orient our social policy 
to handle the issues. 
5. 
While social policy in the 1960s and part of the 1970s 
was concerned with seeking initiatives to redress inequalities, 
and while it was successful in the diversion of considerable 
sums into welfare coffers, the magnitude of the task was so 
great that successes were not always clear and apparent. 
Then, before the welfare task was firmly and legitimately 
entrenched, a neo-conservative counter-attack was successfully 
launched. 
By the 1980s social policy, which had been on the offensive 
in earlier decades was clearly on the defensive - responding to 
changing fortunes rather than trying to shape social futures; 
working out how best to pick up pieces, rather than developing 
comprehensive preventive mechanisms. If social policy is to 
succeed, in the 1980s, as a relevant, credible and humane 
activity it must provide a theoretical and empirical basis for 
social intervention, and interventionist activities must be 
geared to three things: the creation of a social and economic 
environment which is conducive to redistribution and which 
provides substantial investment in human capital, and public 
goods and services; an equitable income support system; a 
set of personal social services. 
In order to create the necessary environment and the 
appropriate outputs three main actors: governments; voluntary 
agencies; and families and informal support systems each play 
signigicant roleso These actors are able to generate three 
types of outputs : tangible resources; effective services; 
and close companionship. It is the combination of these three 
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things - tangible resources, effective services, and close 
companionship - to which our welfare futures must increasingly 
be geared. Very crudely, the first is best delivered by 
government because only government really has the resources to 
meet the income maintenance needs evident in modern societies. 
The second comes largely through non-government welfare 
organizations (NGWOs). The third, companionship, and family 
support cannot be delivered bureaucratically and analysis here 
gets us into the realm of informal services, family care 
systems, informal supports, and all the things that come with 
kinship and friendship networks. 
Each of these three, governments, NGWOs and families are 
under great pressure and one operationally heuristic tool might 
be to examine issues of capacity and willingness of the various 
major actors and del1very systems. 
Government is not going to be able to meet all of the 
demands from the community or even deal with all of the 
legitimate claims placed on it. But government will have a 
central role, and for government to operate authoritatively, 
it must have extractive, regulative and distributive 
capabilities, as well as be responsive to community interests. 
It must be able to extract the best skills its citizens can 
offer, and also be able to extract taxation on an equitable 
and efficient basis. It must also be able to regulate in 
areas that affect quality of life and levels of living and 
it must be able to distribute and redistribute life chances. 
Some people say these things are too much for government in the 
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sort of societies we live in, but these are the key elements 
in ensuring the well being not only of families, but of 
everybody in the community. 
I am not going to talk about the second part of the 
triangle, NGWOs. In our research centre we have published 
several research reports documenting their strengths, weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities as they relate both to governments, and to 
families. 
Informal support is basically the purview of families, and 
due to demographic and labour force changes, as well as changing 
socio-cultural expectations and relationships the family is 
under a great deal of pressure. Politicians who stress the 
virtues of family care are either unaware of the costs to 
families of providing that care or are cynically expecting a 
major shift in social provision and social resources, with the 
result that those least able to provide adequately will find 
greater burdens thrust upon them. For a whole host of reasons 
we cannot formulate care policies particularly for elderly and 
disabled people on the expectation of the unpaid labour of women. 
Furthermore we must always remember that not all people have a 
caring social network which they can call upon if necessary, nor 
are people always happy to intervene informally in the 
difficulties of others. 
In most industrial societies we are faced with an 
explosion of care and we can see the traditional care providing 
organizations all facing different sorts of pressures. What 
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is very obvious is that no one sector alone can provide all 
that has to be provided. Certainly not government - certainly 
not voluntary agencies - certainly not families. Different 
needs are met by different support systems. 
In the Social Welfare Research Centre we have done 
extensive research on the capaci~ies of the three care 
providing systems and have developed substantial data sources. 
Government's capacity is determined by its willingness, and 
in Australia the key lies in reform of the taxation system. 
From recent experience it can be argued that the tax system 
has the capacity, but not the willingness. Families have the 
willingness but not the capacity to provide the care and support 
that is required, and although the bulk of care which is 
provided does come through the family, policy makers must ensure 
that boundaries of ·capacity are carefully understood and that 
unrealistic expectations do not become the norm. 
The 1980s and beyond will probably see more unequal 
societies with more people excluded from what we see as the 
mainstream of modern affluent industrial life. The arguments 
about present and future performance of the welfare state are 
arguments about claims on the system, about social, political 
and economic claims - and about the legitimacy of those claims. 
With a declining economic surplus and even greater competition 
for resources, with high unemployment with technological change 
and uncertain work futures, we are in a claim crisis. 
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To argue then that it is appropriate to make more claims 
on the family is not a helpful way through the claim crisis. 
If we think of governments, NGWOs, and families as in some 
sort of capacity hierarchy, we can argue that willingness is 
inversely related to capacity, and that as one moves down the 
hierarchy the operator in question is less and less able to 
deflect @r reject the claims made. Government with its 
eligibility requirements can quite dispassionately send claims 
which it cannot meet onto NGWOs and families. NGWOs likewise 
can draw lines and pass the excess onto families. Families are 
the providers both of first and last resort - as our research 
shows, a repository of willingness, but often lacking in 
capacity. 
From their cross national research data Alfred Kahn and 
Sheila Kamerman have concluded that in those countries with 
explicit family policies families with children are generally 
better off financially than comparable families, in countries 
in which explicit family policies have not been developed. By 
analysing income maintenance and taxation systems cross 
nationally Kahn and Kamerman show that explicit support through 
the tax transfer system benefits families. One could take 
this a step 1urther and argue that countries that support 
horizontal and vertical equity in their tax transfer systems 
and which have comprehensive social service systems are those 
which have made an overall social policy commitment. Consequently 
explicit family policy is a corollary of comprehensive social 
policy, rather than 9omething seen in isolation. What we ought 
to be aiming at, I would argue, is thoughtful and humane social 
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policy for all the people in our society, and in that way 
those in families and those without family supports will have 
their legitimate claims processed. 
If one were to argue that successful social policy is 
oriented to the minimisation of dependency and the redistribution 
of life chances, then placing increasing emphasis on family 
policy is exclusionary rather than inclusionary. What we 
should be aiming for is a redistributive, protective social 
infrastructure. We can so easily get ourselves bogged down in 
defining what a family consists of and the resultant debate 
could well obscure the objective. What we need are good and 
broad ranging health policies, income support policies, taxation 
policies, child care policies, aged care policies and 
comprehensive social service supports. 
Perhaps then, in times of dramatic social change, of 
changing population structure, of economic re-orientation we 
might see less of an emphasis on promotional pressure group 
activity exclusively, and a shift to a combination of 
promotional activity and sectional activity, so that specific 
dependent groups can have their claims articulated while at 
the same time, but not to the exclusion of sectional interests, 
broad principles of equity and social justice can be promoted. 
